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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
EJ. A. 'VALTON,
Appellant,
vs.
TRACY LOAN AND TRUST
OOMP ANY, a corporation;
SALT LAKE CITY, a municipal corporation of Utah;
GEORGE T. HANSEN, .J. A.
ROCKWOOD, W. E. FIFE,
ROYAL W. DAYNES, and
T. A. SCHOENFELD, as members ·of the Board of Adjustment, Salt Lake City,
Respondents,
N. L. C R 0 0 K S T 0 N, J. S.
PEHRSON, PHILLIP
SCHONERT, and MARY LaCHAPELL,
Interveners and Appellants.

No. 6118

RESPONDENTS' BRIEF
1.
Salt Lake City Was Nnt a Proper Party to this Action. The
Sustaining of its Demurre'r Was Correct.

A. The validity of the zoning provisions of 1Salt
Lake City's ordinance is not in issue in this action.
The Plaintiff and Interveners are not questioning their
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validity. In fact, they claim their benefits. Without the
restrictions contained in the ordinance they would not
be in court. They assert that the ordinance protects
their properties and they are asking that the ·ordinance
be literally enforced. rrhe Respondents do not question
the validity of the ordinance. Respondent, Tracy
Loan and Trust Company, recognized its binding force
in appealing to the Board of Adjustment for a variation.
Therefore all parties are before the Court recognizing
the validity of the zoning legislation (except Appellants
question the validity and powers of the Board of Adjustment) insofar as its ''use'' provisions are concerned.
B. Salt Lake City, as an arm of the State government, is not complaining of the action ·Of the Board of
Adjustment; hence 1Sec. 15-8-104 R. S. 1933 is not relevant. Salt Lake City has no grievance to present to the
Court. rrhe grievances are those of Appellants. Salt
Lake City, as a municipal corporation, cannot correct
the errors of the Board of Adjustment, if any were committed. This is a duty of the Courts. The Board of
City Commissioners has no authority to set aside the
Findings and Order of the .Board of Adjustment in this
case.
C. Salt Lake City, as a municipal corporation and
therefore an arm of the State, is not called upon in this
action to defend its zoning ordinance. The power of
its Board of City Commissioners to enact it is not questioned by any of the parties to this action; in fact, all of
the parties either assert or admit this power existed
and now exists.
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D. The absence of Salt Lake City as a municipal
corporation from this action does not hinder nor limit
the Courts in controlling the Board of Adjustment. The
presence of the City would not in any respect increase
the Court's authority or add to the effectiveness of its
judgment.
The District Court was correct in sustaining the
demurrer of Salt Lake City, a municipal corporation.

2.
The Board of Adjustment Is a Proper Party Defendant. It
Had the Right to Participate in the Trial of the
Plenary Action in th:e District Court; To Present Evidence and Cross-Examine Appellants' Witnesses.

A.

The Appellants are estopped to question the

presence of the Board of Adjustment in this action. It
was brought bef,ore the District Court at the instance
.of Appellants. The Board did not intervene nor appear
in the plenary action voluntarily. The members thereof
were summoned to appear under proper process of the
Court.
B.

They complied with the demand.
'rhe Board of Adjustment having been made a

party to the plenary action, had a right to file an answer
to plaintiff's and intervener's complaints and participate in the trial.

Even if the Board is not a necessary

party, it is certainly a proper party.

Since when has

a proper party defendant been debarred from participa-
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tion in the trial when he is brought before the Court by
action of the opposite party?
70 Corpus Juris 611 ;
State vs. Zolantakis, 70 Utah 296;
259 Pac. 1044; 54 A. L. R. 1463;
Taylor vs. Lytle, 141 Pac. (Idaho) at pg. 94.
C.

But the Board ·of Adjustment is a necessary

party to the plenary action.

It is charged with the

performance of important duties and exercises important functions both under the zoning statute of the State
and zoning Ordinance of the City, Section 15-8-101, R. S.
1933. Public officers charged with performance of duties
or exercising power and authority under a law or a city
ordinance must be brought before the Court and are
entitled to partieipate in the trial of the issues.
Skagit County vs. Northern Pacific Hail way
Co., 61 Fed. (2nd) 6:38; 86 A. L. R. 1012.
D.

Miles vs. McKinney, 199 Atlantic (Maryland)

540 at pg. 543 is not in point because:
(a) The l\laryland zoning law did not provide for a plenary action in court to review the
action of the Board of Adjustment as does the
Utah ~Statute.
(b) The Board of Adjustment attempted
an appeal from the trial court's judgment to the
Appellate Court. It was the moving party. It
attempted to overthrow its own decision.
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3.
The Function of the Dish"ict Court in the Trial of the
Plenary Action under Section 15-8-104, R. S. 1933 Is
to Determine if the, Action of the Board of Adjustment
Was Capricious or Arbitrary and Whether or Not the
Action of the Board in Granting or Denying a Variance from the Zoning Ordinance Was a Reasonable
Exercise of the Discretion Vested in It by Law.

A.

Section 15-8-108 R. S. 1933 provides:
''The city or any person aggrieved by any
decision of the board of adjustment or zoning
commission may have and maintain a plenary
action for relief therefrom in any court of competent jurisdiction.''

This method of reviewing the order of the Board of
Adjustment in granting or denying a variance appears
to be a unique feature of the Utah statute.

Ordinarily

the method of judicial review is either by the writ of
review or certiorari.

Metzenbaum, Law of Zoning 257.

We have not, after exhaustive search, been able to find a
corresponding provision in the zoning law of any other
jurisdiction.
What is meant by the term "plenary action" as
used in this section? The text books and encyclopedias,
and even the court decisions are singularly silent in
defining "plenary action".

The best and about the

only definition we have been able to discover is con-
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tained in Central Republic Bank and Trust Co. vs. Caldwell, 58 Fed. (2nd) 732:
''The main characteristic differences between
a summary proceeding and a plenary suit are:
the :former is based upon petition and proceeds
without formal pleadings; the latter proceeds
upon formal pleadings. In the former, the necessary parties are cited in by order to show cause;
in the latter, formal summons brings in the parties other than plaintiff. In the former, short
time notice is fixed by the court; in the latter,
time for pleading and hearing is fixed by statute
or rule of court. In the former, the hearing is
quite generally upon affidavits; in the latter, examination of witnesses is the usual method. In
the former, the hearing is sometimes ex parte;
in the latter a full hearing is had."
Webster's New International Dictionary defines
"plenary" as: "full, entire, complete, absolute, unqualified; fully attended or constituted; including all entitled
to be present; having full powers."

It is submitted that the legislature in using the term
"plenary action" in section 15-8-108 R. S. 1933, intended
to provide a method of review of the order of the Board
of Adjustment which would be conducted in the District
Court with all of the propriety and formality of an
action commenced and prosecuted in said Court under
the Code of Civil Pr•ocedure. The defendants must be
served with summons; there must be formal pleadings
resulting in issues; there must be a formal trial, with
witnesses examined and cross examined in open court;
the rules of evidence shall apply; there must result
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Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and a Judgment.
All of these requirements were met in the instant case.
All necessary and proper parties were before the Court
represented by counsel. All ·of the mandatory formalities of a "trial" were obeyed. The aggrieved parties
had and maintained their "plenary action for relief"
from the "decision of the Board of Adjustment".
B. The statute is silent as to the duty of the Court
in reviewing or passing upon the "decision of the Board
of Adjustment". It is given no rule for guidance.
Nothing is said as to what it shall finally do with the
order of the Board. All is left to implication. May it
affirm it; set it aside; modify it7 If after hearing all of
the evidence, the conclusion of the Court coincides with
that •of the Board, does the Court simply affirm the order
of the Board, or does it enter its own judgment on the
facts, substituting its own conclusion for that of the
Board f If the Court disagrees with the Board, does it
simply nullify the Board's order or does the Oourt substitute its own judgment for that of the Board 1 If it
agrees in part with the Board's order and disagrees
as to other of its features, does the Court modify the
Board's order and as modified, affirm the order, or does
it entirely nullify the order and substitute its own judgment in lieu thereof? These are some of the provoking
questions which the statute does not answer. It is evidently left for the Courts to interpret the provisions of
Section 15-8-104 in the light of precedents and practice
adopted by Courts in reviewing orders and decisions of
administrative boards. It is the duty of the Court, using
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this section, as its authority, to formulate a modus
operandi in reviewing the ''decisions of the Board of
Adjustment.''
C. It is granted that the method of review of the
decision of the Board ,of Adjustment as prescribed by the
Utah statute is distinctive and that the decision of other
jurisdictions on this subject may be but informatory
rather than carrying the weight of binding judicial precedents. Yet it is submitted that there are certain basic
principles of judicial review of administrative orders
and decisions which are cogent and should be adopted.
It is a rather wild surmise to conclude that the legislature after setting up the rather elaborate machinery
of the Board of Adjustment and defining its authority
with care, intended to confer upon the Courts such complete power over zoning variances as to abrogate, obliterate and render valueless the decision of the Board
once an aggrieved party has appealed to the Courts. If
such is the 0orrect conclusion, why should the Board
of Adjustment have been created 1 Why did not the
legislature provide that any person, believing the literal
enforcement of the zoning ordinance in a particular case
resulted in unnecessary hardship to him, "may have and
maintain a plenary action for relief therefrom in any
court of competent jurisdiction 1" It would seem
sensible to conclude that the legislature intended that the
Board's decision should have some weight on judicial
review and that the findings of the Board are entitled
to 'some oonsideration by the Court. To hold that once
the matter is before the Court in the "plenary action"
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the Board's decision is without weight or value, charges
the legislature with wholly disregarding certain well
established rules and practices in the judicial review of
administrative board decisions in zoning cases. We cannot believe the legislature intended to ignore them.
It certainly intended that the Courts possess complete power to review the decisions of the Board of
Adjustment and to such process this counsel heartily
subscribes. He does not like the idea of giving administrative boards' rulings and orders such ''peculiar sanctity" as is attempted to be acoorded them in recent
Federal legislation. This type of legislation represents
the one extreme.

'l_1he other extreme is to give such

orders and decisions no weight or value.

Neither ex-

treme accords with the underlying necessity calling such
boards or commissions into being, nor the legal principles
upholding their existence.
"As civilization becomes more complex * * *
the government must abandon the system of unconditional commands and res·ort to conditional
commands which vest in the administrative offices
larger powers of a discretionary character."
Prof. Frank J. Goodnow, Principles of Administrative Law of the U. S. (1905)
324.
"Congress legislated on the subject as far as
was reasonably practicable, and from the necessities ·of the case was compelled to leave to executive officers the duty of bringing about the
result pointed out by the statute. To deny the
power of Congress to delegate such a duty would,
in effect, amount but to declaring that the plenary
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power vested in Congress to regulate foreign commerce 0ould not be efficaciously exerted.''
Butterfield vs. Stranahan, 192 U. S. 470.
"The appropriate questions for the court
would be whether the commission acted within
the authority conferred by the legislature, and
also, so far as the amount of compensation permitted by the prescribed rates is concerned,
whether the commission went beyond the domain
of the state's legislative power and violated the
constitutional rights of property by imposing confiscatory requirements.''
Louisville & N. R. R. vs. Garrett,
231 U. ~s. 298, 313; 58 Law Ed. 229, 243.
"Manifestly the legislative body cannot fix
any adequate standard or rule, that would fit
every individual C'ase of hardship. That is impossible; and therefore the let,rislative body has
confined the determination of that feature to an
administrative agency-in this case the board of
appeals-as a fact finding body which could determine whether in any specific case unusual hardship might result if the strict letter of the ordinance were complied with.
L. and M. Investment Co. vs. Cutler,
125 Ohio State 12; 180 N. E. 379.

It would therefore seem logical to conclude that the
order or decision of the Board of Adjustment must have
some weight on the trial of the "plenary action".

It

is not to be entirely disregarded nor is it to be given
unreasonable value.

There is a happy middle ground,

based upon reason and practical justice, which has been
evolved by the Courts.

It is submitted that the Court
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can and should adopt the foUowing principles in working
out a practical application of rSection 15-8-104:
(a) There is a presumption in favor of the
correctness of the determination arrived at by the
Board of Adjustment.
Home for Hebrew Infants vs. Hand Realty
Co., 227 N. Y. Supple. 570;
Rev.org Realty Co. vs. \V alsh,
232 N. Y. Supple. 141; 251 N. Y. 516;
Re Dawson, 277 Pac. (Okla.) 226;
Bellofatto vs. Board of Adjustment,
141 Atlantic 781.
(b) To set aside a decision of a zoning board
of adjustment it is necessary to find that its action
has no foundation and reason and is a mere arbitrary or irrati,onal exercise of power, having no
substantial relation to the public health, the public morals, the public safety or the public welfare.
Sundlun vs. 1/.;oning Board,
50 R I. i08; 145 Atlantic 451;
Dra hble vs. Zoning Board,
52 R I. 228; 159 Atlantic 828;
Norcrosse vs. Board, 150 N. E. (Mass.) 887;
Zahn vs. Board, 274 U. S. i325;
71 Law Ed. 1074; 47 Sup. Ct. Rep. 594;
Altschul vs. Ludwig,
216 N. Y. 459; 111 N. E. 216;
Nectow vs. Cambridge,
277 U. S. 183; 72 Law Ed. 842;
Freeman vs. Board of Adjustment,
34 Pac. (2nd) 537 (Montana);
Allen vs. City of Patterson,
121 Atlantic (N .•J.) 610;
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St. Albens-Springfield Corp. vs. Connell,
257 N. Y. 73, 80;
People vs. Leo, 173 N. Y. Supple. 217.
(c) The Board of Adjustment's action is
not limited to cases where witnesses have been
heard. Without any witnesses, it may act on its
own knowledge, for it is made up of men with
special qualifications of training and experience.
Fordham Manor vs. Walsh,
244 N.Y. 280; 155 N. E. 575;
Levy vs. Board of Standards,
276 N. Y. Sup. 370; 267 N. Y. 347; 196
N. E. 284;
People vs. Novick Co.,
283 N. Y. Supple. 762.

4.
The Board of Adjustment of Salt Lake City Is a Legally
Created Fact Finding Body - An Administrative
Agency-Charged with the Duty of Determining
Whether in Any Particular Case Unusual Hardship
Might Result If the Strict Letter of Salt Lake City's
Zoning Ordinance Were Enforced. Its Powers Extend to:
(A) Allowing Slight Deviations from Minor Requirements of the Zoning Ordinance Such as "SetBack", Side-Line, Lot Area, Etc. Requirements;
And
(B) Allowing a Non-Conforming Use of Property
within a Zoning District When Such Use Is Not
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Contrary to Public Interest and Unnecessary
Hardship Would Result from Literal Enforcement of the Ordinance.

A.

Under Section 15-8-101, R. S. 1933 the Board

of Adjustment has the power:
"(:3)-To authorize upon appeal such variance from the terms of the ordinance as will not
be contrary to the public interest, where owing to
special conditions a literal enforcement of the
provisions of the ordinance will result in unnecessary hardship; provided that the spirit of the
ordinance shall be observed and substantial justice done." (Italics :ours).
The Board of Adjustment has a legal existence.
There is no unconstitutional delegation to it of legislative
power.
''In practically all of them (zoning ordinances) provision is made for a board with power
on appeal to authorize, in specific cases, such
variance from the terms of the ordinance, as will
not be contrary to the public interest, where,
owing to special conditions, a literal enforcement
of the provisions of the ordinance will result in
unnecessary hardship, and where the spirit of the
ordinance shall be observed and substantial justice done. Such ordinances have been very generally substained upon the theory that they constitute a valid exercise of the police power; that
is to say they have a substantial bearing upon the
public health, safety, morals, and general welfare
of the community.''
Freeman vs. Board of Adjustment,
34 Pac. (2nd) Montana 537.
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"In earlier days, the argument that the powers conferred upon the board amounted to an unlawful delegation of legislative authority would
have demanded serious consideration. In the light
of a group of comparatively recent decisions
where that subject has been discussed fully, there
can no longer be serious doubt that in this particular the statute does not violate the Constitution. Th,is is true even though the board is
given the power to change on the terms stated
in the statute the bou,ndaries of the several districts or zones established by the legislatu.re itself." (Italics ours).
Bradley vs. Zoning Board of Adjustment,
255 Mass. 160: 150 N. E. 892.
"Undoubtedly the legislature must declare
the policy of the law and fix the legal principles
which are to control in given cases; but an administrative body may be invested with the power
to ascertain the fads and conditions to which the
polieies and prineiples apply. If this could not
be done there would be infinite confusion in the
laws, and in an effort to detail and particularize,
they must miss sufficiently, both in provision and
execution.''
Mutual Film Corp. vs. Industrial Commission, 236 U. ~s. 230; 35 Sup. Ct. Rep. 390.
"In this case 93-1-4 * * * placed an
excise tax on the sale of cigarettes. It was a
function peculiarly within the province of the
Legislature. The matter of administration was
placed with the Tax Commission, a power proper
to give it. The matter of fixing a penalty for
nonpayment of the tax or for failure to affix
stamps was a matter which the Legislature had
plenary power to deal with. The duty of determining whether there was such failure was given
to the administrative body, a function which the
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Legislature may itself perform or give to an
administrative body. So far, the functions given
to the Tax Commission were entirely proper
for the Legislature to delegate. It was not a
delegation of essential legislative powers, but of
powers to carry into effect the expression of the
Legislative will."
Tite vs. State Tax Commission,
57 Pac. (2nd) Page 738.
"We see no distinction in principle between
the usc of a fact finding body for determining
whether or not 'unusual hardships' have resulted
in specific cases and the use of a similar administrative agency to ascertain the fact whether a
picture film is of a moral, educational or harmless
character. ~ianifestly, since unusual hardships
would affect some and not other owners in a
zoning district, the detennination whether the
restriction imposes unusual hardships upon an
individual's property must be left, in specific instances, to the discretion of administrative agencies, but even so the power conferred upon them
cannot be unreasonably or arbitrarily exercised."
L. and ~L Investment Co. vs. Cutler,
125 Ohio State 12; 180 N. E. 379; 86
A. L. R. at 714;
N ectow vs. Cambridge,
277 U. S. 183; 72 Law Ed. 842;
St. Basil's Church vs. Kerner,
125 Misccl. 526; 211 N. Y. 'Supple. 470;
Dowsey vs. Kensington,
257 N. Y. 221; 177 N. E. 427; 86 A. L.
R. 642;
Spencer-Sturla Co. vs. Memphis,
290 S. vV. (Tenn.) 614;

16
McCord vs. Ed. Bond & C. Co.,
175 Georgia 667; 165 S. E. 590; 86
A. L. R. 704;
Red "C" Oil Co. vs. Board of Agriculture,
222 U.S. 380; 56 Law Ed. 240;
Construction Co. vs. Jackson,
152 Maryland 671; 137 Atlantic 278;
In re Daws•on, 277 Pac. (Okla.) 226;
Facey vs. Leo, et al.,
230 N.Y. 602; 130 N. E. 910;
Weaver vs. Bishop, 52 Pac. (2nd) 867;
Tau Alpha Holding Corp. vs. Board of Adjustment, 171 Southern (Fla.) 819.
These authorities conclusively sustain the propositions (a) that the Board of Adjustment of Salt Lake is
a legal existing body; (b) that there is no unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to it in empowering
it to authorize variances from the terms of the zoning
ordinance, not contrary to public interest in order to
avoid unnecessary hardship in particular cases and (c)
that such valid delegation of power includes the authority to authorize a non-conforming use in a particular
zoning district.

It has been indicated very strongly in decisions
upholding the validity of zoning ordinances that such
enactments are saved from the condemnation of unconstitutionality because they had created a board of
adjustment vested with powers to relieve against unreasonable limitations upon full use and enjoyment of
property.
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"In the absence .of such a board vested with
power to prevent the inequalities and injustices
which might otherwise result from strict enforcement of the zoning· ordinance there would be grave
doubts as to the constituti,onality of the ordinanee.''
Freeman vs. Board of Adjustment, (supra) ;
St. Basil's Church vs. Kerner, (supra).
The case of State ex rel. Presbyterian Church vs.
Edgecomb, 108 Neb. 857; 189 N. W. 617 illustrates the
fate of a zoning ordinance that did not contain a provision creating a board of adjustment empowered to
relieve against "unnecessary hardship". It was declared invalid by the Court, but Metzenbaum in his Law
of Zoning affirms that had the ordinance made provision
for adjustments through an administrative board that
it would not have been voided.

B. Under Section 15-8-101, R. S. 1933 the Board of
Adjustment is authorized to permit a non-conforming
use of a particular traet or parcel of land within a
district. The Board may "authorize * * * such variance

front the terms of the ordinance as will not be contrary
to public interest where owing to special conditions a
literal enforcement • • • will result in unnecessary hardship.''
What is a "variance" which may be granted by the
Board? The word "variance" is defined:
"A material difference" (in pleading and
proof). Davidson Grocery Co. vs .•Johnston, 24
ldaho :3:36; 1:~:3 Pacific 929.
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"A substantial departure" (in pleading and
proof). Sposedo vs. Merriam, 111 Maine 530;
90 Atlantic 387.
''Difference' '-Roget 's Thesaurus (American
Edition) page 5.
"Change of condition; deviation; alteration".
Webster's New International Dictionary.
The word "variance" is not a weak word; it has
vitality and strength. There is no meaning of minimum
change or limited adjustment conveyed by its use; oppositely, it carries the sense of "material difference"
and "change of condition". There is nothing in the text
of Section 15-8-101 that requires that the word "variance" bear other than its usual and ordinary meaning.
The section declares that "the spirit of the ordinance
be observed and substantial justice be done". This
phrase strongly suggests that the "variances" to be
granted are such changes and deviations as will ensure
"substantial justice" to all c;oncerned. The statute in
no manner suggests that the "variances" allowable are
only minor ones such as shortening the ''set back'' or
"side line" requirements. The Montana Supreme Court
in the Freeman case has well covered this point:
"In this eonneetion it is suggested that the
variation which the hoard has the power to make
refers only to slight variations, sneh as the
heighth of buildings, or the distance it must be
from the street, etc. \V e find little merit in this
contention. Obviously the legislature could not
fix any definite rule that would fit every inclividual case of alleged hardship. The authority
conferred upon the hoard, was of necessity of a
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general nature and discretionary. The language
u,scd in the provision of the statute and of the
ord'inancc is broad a;nd general. (Italics ours).
It confers on the board considerable latitude for
the exercise of its discretion in any particular
case.''
See also:
'Weaver vs. Bishop, 52 Pac. (2nd) 869;
Tau Alpha Holding Corp. vs. Board,
171 Southern (Fla.) 819.
We suggest that the narr,ow construction placed on
this section by Appellant's counsel reflects the early
zoning decisions as they related to the validity of powers
delegated to the boards of adjustment. There was doubt
in the minds of the courts as to whether or not legislative
powers were delegated to the Board, and in order to
sustain the Board and its authority (and thereby save
the zoning laws and ordinances) the Courts displayed
a tendency to limit the powers of the Board to making
of minor adjustments. As the full scope of the zoning
laws developed and the Oourts more completely sensed
the necessity of endowing the administrative board with
vigorous power and authority, we witness an evolution
characteristic of the Common Law. Instead of leaving
the Board a mere "face saver" for the zoning law, the
Courts rec-ognized the actualities and problems in enforcing a zoning ordinance. There is necessity of allowing non-conforming uses in a district. If the Board were
not permitted to grant them the whole zoning structure
is imperiled. As grave injustices and hardships can be
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inflicted upon a pr,operty owner m denying him a nonconforming use as in refusing him a minor adjustmentin fact the hardships would probably be more severe.
The courts have now declared that the legislature can
empower a Board of Adjustment to allow non-comf,orming uses, and that such delegated power is not legislative,
but simply a "fact finding" function and part of the
administrative duties of the Board. Hence the "variance'' that the Board can order must not be limited to
those minor changes and alterations urged by Appellants, but must of necessity be as broad as the power
granted. The statute does not justify a narrow construction. ''The language used in the provision of the
statute and of the ordinance is broad and general."
Appellants stress the distinetion between the powers
granted the "legislative body'' (Salt Lake City Commission) and the powers ·Conferred upon the Board of
Adjustment by the Utah zoning law, and art,rue that if
the powers granted to the Board of Adjustment includes
that of granting a non-conforming use in a given zoning
district that the "Board of Adjustment may in effect
repeal'' the zoning ordinance in whole or in part as to
a particular district. This argument ignores the limitations and restrictions contained in sub-paragraph (3)
of Sec. 15-8-101. The "variance" which may be authorized must be one (a) "not contrary to public interest;"
(b) "special conditions" must produce "unnecessary
hardship" owing to a "literal enforcement" of the
ordinance; (c) the "spirit of the ordinance shall be
observed" and (d) "substantial justice" must be done.

21
These oonditions upon which the Board's grant of a
"variance" must be based certainly prevent the Board
from "repealing" the ordinance or altering it to any
great extent. Any action by the Board is subject to
review by the Courts. It is definitely limited in the
exercise of the power to grant "variances". In the case
at bar the "variance" granted is well within the four
limitations of the statute. The "use" granted Tracy
Loan and Trust Company for its lot, prevents an "unnecessary hardship"; it does "substantial justice" and
yet observes the "spirit of the ordinance".

5.
The Board of Adjustment Exercised Its Power in a Legal
.Manner; Did Not Act Arbitrarily or Capriciously, and
Rightfully Relieved Respondent, Tracy Loan and Trust
Company from Suffering Unnecessary Hardship Caused
by a Literal Enforcement of the Zoning Ordinance.

A. Respondents submit that they have established
the following principles which must govern the Courts
in considering the order of variance of the Board of
Adjustment:
(a) There is a presumption in favor of the
correctness of the determination arrived at by the
Board of Adjustment. (See Section 3, Subdivision C, Paragraph (a) of this brief).
(b) To set aside a decision of a zoning board
of adjustment it is necessary to find that its
action has no foundation and reason, and is a
mere arbitrary and irrational exercise of power,
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having no substantial relation to the public health,
the public morals, the public safety or the public
welfare. (See Section 3, Subdivision C, paragraph
(b) of this brief).
Prima facie, therefore the Board's order must be
accepted, unless it appears to be the result of capricious
or arbitrary conduct. Was the Board guilty of such
conduct, ,on the evidence submitted at the trial of the
"plenary action"~ The Board's order must be based
on facts that show:
1. Special conditions existed which would
result in inflicting on Respondent, Tracy Loan
and Trust Company unnecessary hardship if the
zoning' ordinance were literally enforced.
2. 'fhat by granting the variance substantial jnstice was done.
3. That the spirit of the 'ordinance was observed and the granting of the variance was not
contrary to public interest.
1. Special condit,ions existed which would result in
inflicting on Respondent, Tracy Loan and Trust Company u;nnecessary hardship if the zoning ordinance were
literally enf arced.
A. The property of Respondent, 'fracy l.1oan and
Trust Company (hereafter designated Tracy property)
is a vacant lot. The bouse formerly located on it was
demolished under pressure of the City. (Appellant's
Abstract pgs. 57-58) The property immediately north
of the Tracy property is occupied by a dilapidated shack
highly detrimental to the neighborhood. (Appellant's
abstract pgs. 31 and 32).
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B. Diagonally across the street from the Tracy
property and east of the Walton properties is loeated
Dickinson's Grocery Store and Vetter's Meat Market.
Delivery trucks at certain hours of the day are backed
up in front of the store and the market. (Respondent's
Abstract pg. 3)
C. At the intersection of South 8th East Street and
Ear,;t 2nd South 1Street (a bloek east of the Tracy property) are located a r,;ervice ,station on one corner, an
ice cream manufacturer on another corner and a grocery
(Lucas) store next to the south-east corner. This is a
commercial or business intersection. (Respondent's Abstract pg. 33)
D. A survey of East 2nd South and South 7th East
Streets for a block extending in all four directions
(Transcript 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113) shows that 23
of the houses _were occupied by owners; 15 by tenants and
12 were occupied as apartment houses and rooming
houses. (Transcript 114) About 50o/o of the houses are
occupied by the owners and 50o/o occupied by tenants
and lessees and as rooming houses. (Transcript 114)
E. The area in which the Tracy property and the
properties of Appellants are located is no longer a residential district-as a residential district it is largely
a thing of the past. (Respondent's Abstract pg. 18) It
is a rental district and does not lend itself to residential
purposes. (Respondent's Abstract 19) It is an old time
residential district invaded by tenancy people. (Respondent's Abstract pg. 20)

24
F. The houses m the neighborhood were built
around 30 years ago. (Respondent's Abstract pg. 11)
G. The Appellant Walton's properties consist of
his home and apartments and multi-family dwellings
owned and operated by him for income purposes. (Appellant's Transcript pgs. 44 and 45)
H. Neither the owners of the property on the east
(Halloran) nor •on the north (Simonds) of the Tracy
property have objected to the variance granted. (Appellant's Abstract 64; Transcript pgs. 96 and 99)
I. The Tracy property does not lend itself for
investment for resident purposes (Respondent's Abstract pg. 19) nor would it yield an income for private
residential purposes because the ground value plus the
cost of a private rental residence would put the cost
out of line; a man who would pay $6,000.00 for a house
would not buy it in this district because it is an old
time residence district invaded by tenancy people. (Respondent's Abstract pgs. 19 and 20) The demand is for
modern houses in a district protected by building restrictions in the deeds. (Respondent's Abstract pg. 20)
There has been but •one new residence erected in this
district two blocks east of the Tracy property. (Respondent's Abstract pg. 21) The Tracy property must
be used as a business rental property. (Respondent's
Abstract pg. 23) It would not be economically sound
to build an apartment house for the reason rents have
not raised to the level they were before the depression.
(Respondent's Abstract pgs. 23, 35, 36) It would be
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next to impossible to sell the Tracy property for residential purposes. (Respondent's Abstract pg. 34) The
Tracy property can be sold for about $4,000.00 and that
is its going value but not for residence purposes because
at that value a buyer would want Federal Heights or
east bench property. (Respondent's Abstract pg. 19)

That by granting the variance substantial justice
was done.
2.

A. The area surrounding the Tracy property as
residential district is largely a thing of the past. (Appellant's witness, Peterson; Respondent's Abstract pg.
18) It is an old time residence district invaded by tenancy people. (Respondent's Abstract pg. 20) It would
be next to impossible to sell the Tracy property for
residence purposes. (Respondent's Abstract pg. 34)
B. The construction and operation of a service
station on the Tracy property would not depreciate the
values of the properties of the several appellants. (Respondent's Abstract pgs. 22, 24, 25, 26, 27, 30, 31)

That the spirit of the Ordinance was observed
and the granting of the varian.ce was not contrary to
public interest.
3.

A.

East Second South and :South 7th East Streets

are each 10 rods wide. (Respondent's Abstract pg. 7)
These streets are paved and the bus has replaced the
street car on East 2nd South Street. (Appellant's Abstract pg. 54)
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B.

.Service stations are today kept clean and lighted

and the air space is better. (Respondent's Abstract pgs.
28 and 30)

The above summary of the evidence upon which the
trial court made its Findings justifies the conclusion
that the Board of Adjustment acted fairly and justly
and its order of variance was not an arbitrary act, but
one that met all of the requirements of the statute.

6.
The Area of Salt Lake City in and about the Intersection
of East 2nd South Street and South 7th East Street Is
No Longer An Area Constituting An Exclusive Residential Section of Said City (8th Finding of Fact; Appellants' Assignment No. 1).

The evidence abundantly sustains this Finding.
(a) Appellants witness Pett~rsm1 was asked:
"In ,other words, Mr. Peterson, isn't it a fact,
that up in that territory as a residential district,
it is largely a thing of the past~'' He replied:
"Yes, I ·would say it is." (Respondent's Abstract
pg. 18)
(b) Respondent's witness Gaddis testified:
"It is more or less a rental uistrid, and the price,
on account of the price, I don't think it lends itself
to residential purposes. It is an old time residence district invaded by tenancy people. (Respondent's Abstract pgs. 19 and 20)
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(e) Respondent's witness \V eeks testified:
"It (Tracy property) would be next to impossible
to sell it for residential purposes."
(d) Respondent's witness Kipp testified
that in this area 2:3 of the houses were occupied
by owners; 15 by tenants and 12 were oceupied
as apartment houses and rooming houses. About
50% of the houses are occupied by the owners
and 50;Yo occupied by tenants, and lessees and as
rooming houses. (Transcript pgs. 108 to 114 inclusive) Appellant's Abstract does not correctly
reflect Kipp 's testimony.
(e) A grocery store and meat market occupies the southwest corner of the intersection
immediately east ·Of the ~Walton property. ( Respondent's Abstract pg. 3)

7.
The Tracy Property Cannot Be Sold for Residential Purposes and That Respondent Tracy J.oan and Trust
Co. Cannot Secure a Reasonable Income Therefrom and
Unless Permitted to Use the Same for Commercial
Purposes Its Value Will Be Confiscated (lOth Finding
of Fact; Appellants' Assignment No. 3).
This Finding is supported by substantial testimony.
(a) The area in which the Tracy property
is located is no longer a residential district-as
a residential district it is largely a thing of the
past. (Respondent's Abstract pg. 18) It is a
rental district and does not lend itself to residential purposes. (Respondent's Abstract pg. 19)
It is an old time residential district invaded by
tenancy people. (Respondent's Abstract pg. 20)
The houses in the neighborhood were built around
30 years ago. (Respondent's Abstract pg. 11)
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(b) It_ would be next to impossible to sell
the Tracy property for residence purposes. (Respondent's Abstract pg. 34)
(c) The Tracy property does not lend itself
for investment for resident purposes. (Respondent's Abstract pg. 19) It would not yield an income for private residential purposes because the
ground value plus the cost of a private rental
residence would put the cost out of line. (Respondent's Abstract pgs. 19 and 20)
(d) The Tracy property must be used as a
business rental property. (Respondent's Abstract
pg. 21) It would not be economically sound to
build an apartment house thereon (Respondent's
Abstraet pgs. 2:1, 3;) and :36) It can be sold for
$4,000.00 but not for residence purposes.

8.
That the Propos,ed Service Station to Be Erected on the
Tracy Property Will Be Beautified and Made Sightly
(11th Finding of Fact; Appellants' Assignment No. 4).
This Finding is justified by Gaddis' testimony at
Respondent's Abstract pg. 28 and \V eeks testimony at
Appellant's Abstract pgs. 63 and 64. It is submitted
that this Finding is unimportant inasmuch as the variance order of the Board of Adjustment specified no
conditions for the ereetion of the service station. (Transcript pg. 95)

9.
That the Erection and Operation of the Service Station
Will Not Decrease the Value of Plaintiffs' Premises or
the Interveners' premises; nor decease Their Desir-
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ability for Residential or for Rental Purposes (13th
and 14th Findings of Fact; Appellants' Assignment
No.3).

These Findings are fully supported by the evidence
of the witnesses Gaddis and Weeks. (Respondent's Abstract pgs. 22, 24, 25, 26, 27, 30 and 31)
10.
That the Erection and Operation of the Proposed Service
Station Will have a Tendency to Increase the Desirability for Residential Purposes of the Premises One
Block in Each Direction from the Tracy Property (14th
Finding of Fact; Appellants' Assignment No. 6).

This Finding is supported by the testimony of witness \Veeks. (Respondent's Abstract pg. 30)
11.
That the Tracy Property Is Not Fitted for Residential Purposes (14th, Finding of Fact; Appellants' Assignment
No.7).

This :F'inding has complete support from the following evidence :
(a) Peterson's testimony at pg. 18 of Hespondent's AlJstract. (Peterson appeared as a
witness for Appellants).
(b) Gaddis' testimony at pgs. 19, 20, 23 and
24 Hespondent 's Abstract.
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(c)

Weeks testimony at pg-s. 31, 34.

It is submitted that judg-ment of the District Court
should be affirmed.

RITER & COWAN,
Attorneys for Respondent,
Tracy Loan & Trust Co.

FISHER HARRIS,
E. R. OIIRJiSTENSEN and

GERALD IRVINE,
Attorneys for other
Respondents.

